Side-channel analysis of error-correcting codes for PUFs

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) exploit manufacturing process variations to generate unique signatures. PUF and error-correcting codes can be joined together to reliably generate cryptographically strong keys. However, the implementation of error-correcting codes is prone to physical attacks like side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks exploit the information leaked during the computation of secret intermediate states to recover the secret key. Therefore, the implementation of error-correcting codes must also involve the implementation of proper countermeasures against side-channel attacks.

The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the side-channel resistance of a secure implementation of error-correcting codes for PUFs on FPGA. The thesis consists of the following steps:

- Get familiar with currently available implementations of error-correcting codes for PUFs
- Adapt and improve current implementations (VHDL)
- Develop a measurement setup for side-channel analysis (Matlab/Python)
- Perform side-channel analysis using the state-of-the-art EMF measurement equipment in our lab (Oscilloscope knowledge + Matlab/Python required)

**Prerequisites**

The ideal candidate should have:

- Previous experience in field of digital design (VHDL/Vivado/Xilinx FPGA)
- Basic knowledge on using lab equipment (e.g. Oscilloscope,...)
- Basic knowledge in statistics
- Good programming skills in Matlab/Python
- Attendance at the lecture “Secure Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithms” is advantageous

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