

Seminar

# Protecting Cloud FPGAs against a Malicious Cloud Provider

FPGAs are becoming a commonly used platforms in cloud environments which lead to the emergence of the FPGA-as-a-service computation paradigm. In such a scenario, it is vital to protect the bitstream from an untrusted cloud provider, such that it cannot steal intellectual properties contained in the customer design and prevent the insertion of trojans inside a design. This seminar should present the mechanisms suggested by the research community to address these two issues and put them in perspective with what commercial cloud providers are currently offering.

## References

- [1] C.Jin et al., **Security of Cloud FPGAs: A Survey**, preprint available at <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.04867.pdf>
- [2]H. Englund et al., **Secure acceleration on cloud-based FPGAs - FPGA enclaves**, 2020 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops (IPDPSW)
- [3] A. Duncan et al., **SeRFI: Secure Remote FPGA Initialization in an Untrusted Environment**, 2020 IEEE 38th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS)

## Contact

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