Master's Thesis

[security] Practical implementation of physical-layer semantic security
The goal of this project is to implement in Python/Sagemath the security functions (at least one of four) described in https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.00983
Sagemath contains libraries for mosaics, BIBDs, etc, that can be used for the project.

**Motivation:**
There are various types of security definitions.
The mutual information based types, in increasing order of security requirement are

1. Weak secrecy asks that the average mutual information of the eavesdropper I(M:E)/n goes to 0 for a uniform message M (average here means averaged over the blocklength n, an additional average over M is implicit in the mutual information)
2. Strong secrecy asks that the total mutual information I(M:E) goes to 0,
3. Semantic security asks that the total mutual information I(M:E) goes to 0 for any distribution of the message M (and thus in particular for all distributions that pick any of two chosen messages with 1/2 probability)

Then there are the almost-equivalent respective indistinguishability types of security requirements (below |P-Q|₁ is the statistical distance and Exp_M is expectation value over M)

1. average indistinguishability 1/n Exp_M | P_{(E|M)} - P_{E} |_1 for a uniform message M goes to 0 (again average refers over the blocklength n, clearly there is also the average over M)
2. total indistinguishability Exp_M | P_{(E|M)} - P_{E} |_1 for a uniform message M goes to 0
3. indistinguishability |P_{(E|m)} - P_{(E|m')}|₁ for any two messages m and m' goes to 0.

Each of the indistinguishabilities can also be written using KL divergence instead of statistical distance, in which case the conditions are exactly equivalent to their mutual information versions.

Strong secrecy is the standard security requirement considered in information-theoretic security, while semantic security is the minimum requirement considered in computational security. Information-theoretic (physical-layer) security differs from computational security in that the secrecy is guaranteed irrespective of the power of the adversary, while in computational security E is computationally bounded. Computational security also assumes that the message is at least of a certain length for the schemes to work, and thus if the message to be secured is too small it needs to be padded to a larger message.

In practice, information theoretical security is expensive, because the messages that can be secured can be only as long as the keys that can be generated. However, in identification only a very small part of the message needs to be secured, which in computational security triggers padding and thus waste, but on the other side makes information-theoretic security accessible and not so expensive.

At the same time, the security of identification implicitly requires semantic security. It has been known for a while that hash functions provide information-theoretic strong secrecy. However, because the standard for information-theoretic security has been strong secrecy, before https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.00983 no efficient functions where known to provide information-theoretic semantic security.

We need an implementation of these type of functions so that we can integrate information-theoretic security into our identification project.

**Advisors**

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